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THE UNEASY CASE FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE
INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
WILLIAM Lomm*
The purpose of this paper is to develop a case for foreign
private investment in underdeveloped areas. The policy in de-
veloped countries toward such investment has exaggerated the
favorable aspects of private investment while all but ignoring
the detriments. This policy has caused undesirable positions
to be assumed by both the investing and the host countries. For
expositional purposes this paper will concentrate on investments
originating in the United States destined for Latin Amerca. First,
will be an examnation of the general magnitude of foreign in-
vestment. Second, the cases both for and against foreign invest-
ment, paying special attention to Latin American attitudes, will
be presented. Third, will be a close look at major U.S. policy,
especially as it has added to international tension. Finally,
some suggestions will be made for policies which would reduce
the potential for international conflict and maximize whatever
benefits might accrue to Latin America from foreign invest-
ments.
Latin America has long been a target of U.S. investors.
Prior to 1930, foreign capital entering the Latin republics was
largely unrestricted. In response to increasing world demands
for raw materials needed for industrial development, large
amounts of capital were invested in Latin America, mostly in
extractive industries. The great depression reversed this trend
temporarily, but renewed resource scarcity during World War
II stimulated the inflow of private capital and guided many
Latin American countries through what for some has been their
period of most vigorous growth. Since then these countries in
the aggregate have been able to finance over 90% of their
investment from their own resources.' Most external capital
continued to come from private sources until the late 1950's
when declining private capital was matched by that available
through international development agencies and bilateral aid.
In 1929 almost one-half ($3.5 billion) of all foreign direct
Professor of Economics, University of Denver Graduate School of In-
ternational Studies.
Holly, External Finance, in LATiN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN; A HAND-
BOOK 521 (C. Veliz ed. 1968).
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private investment from the United States ($7.5 billion) was lo-
cated in Latin America. Since then other areas of the world have
increased their relative attractiveness to U.S. investors. Through-
out the 1960's for example, earnings on investments in other
developing areas averaged from 5% to almost 9% higher than
in Latin America, and even Europe offered over 2% more.
Thus, the book value of U.S. private investment has increased
by about 4.5% per year in Latin America but at a 9.0% rate for
all other regions combined.2 Today, only about 1/5 of U.S. private
direct investment is in Latin America.
The main outflow of private capital from the United States
to Latin America is in the form of direct private investment.
Generally, direct investment refers to the committment of re-
sources by U.S. residents to foreign firms controlled by U.S. in-
terests. The magnitude of these and other forms of investment
appear in Table 1. In 1962, net direct investment outflow from
the United States to Latin America was actually negative due to
TABLE 1
U.S. INVESTMETr IN LATIN AMERICA (MILLIONS $)
Net Dir. Re- Tot. Net Total Dir. Re- Tot. Tot.
Invest. invest. Dir. Portfolio invest. Invest, invest. Dir. Invest.
Outflow Earn- Invest. Invest. O'flow Earn. Invest. exclud-
ings minus minus exclud- ing
peiro petro ing Dir.
in in Venez. Invest.
Venez. Venez. petro in
Venez.
petro
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1962 -32 268 236 9 245 135 278 413 422
1963 69 173 242 17 259 110 183 293 310
1964 143 216 359 194 553 168 217 385 579
1965 176 306 482 26 508 274 308 582 608
1966 190 302 492 50 542 291 303 594 644
1967 184 181 365 84 449 258 180 438 522
1968 677 358 1035 114 1149 470 364 834 948
1969 345 376 721 354 390 744
Source: SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS (various issues)
repatriation of capital from extraordinarily large investments in
the petroleum industry in Venezuela. Since investment activity
in that single country is large enough to affect the picture for
Latin America as a whole, we present data in columns 6-9 with
the Venezuelan influence removed. Outflows of capital from the
United States are not the only source of direct investment. Each
year a large amount of the earnings on already existing direct
investments are retained and reinvested in Latin America, in-
2 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY Assoc., THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAY-
MENTS 19 (1966); COUNCIL FOR LATIN AMERICA, THE EFFECT OF U.S.
AND OTHER FOREIGN INVESTMENT ON LATIN AMERICA 64, 66 (1970).
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stead of being repatriated for distribution among interest hold-
ers in the United States. The sum of these two sources of direct
investment appears in column 3. The purchase of Latin Amer-
ican securities by U.S. residents can be added to total direct
investment to obtain total yearly investment in column 5 (Col.
9, without the influence of direct investment in Venezuelan
petroleum).
One cannot assume that U.S. investors make a net contri-
bution to Latin American enterprise as investments give rise to
earnings, some portion of which are repatriated to be distributed
among the original contributors of capital. Indeed, the incentive
to investors is some assurance that they will eventually receive
more than their original contribution, and a steadily increasing
book value of investments implies that in the long run a
steadily increasing flow of funds to the original source will be
observed. Table 2 shows that earnings remitted to the United
States on investments in Latin America far exceed the new in-
vestment flow in the opposite direction. The net annual average
outflow of funds from Latin America to the United States over
the period shown is about $1 billion. It is worth noting here
that should the investment inflow to Latin America stop en-
tirely the outflow to the United States would continue (at a
decreasing rate) due to coninued earnings on already existing
investments. Latin America is, therefore, in a very difficult
position if she decides that foreign private investment is no
longer desired. Exclusion of new foreign investors will aggra-
vate the net outflow of earnings on existing investments since
part of that outflow would no longer be matched by private
capital imports. On this basis alone one would expect to find
TABLE 2
LATIN AMERICAN REMISSIONS TO THE U.S. (MILLIONS $)
Net Outflow from
Earnings on Earnings on Latin America
Dir. Private Other Private Total Inflow to to U.S.
Investment Investment TOTAL Latin America (Col. 4-Col. 3)
1962 762 135 897 -23 920
1963 956 156 1112 86 1026
1964 1016 211 1227 337 890
1965 1014 257 1271 202 1069
1966 1111 309 1420 240 1180
1967 1190 356 1546 268 1278
1968 1248 405 1653 791 862
1969
a Net direct investment inflow plus Net Portfolio Investment (from
Table 1)
Source: SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS
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policies restricting new foreign investment to be accompanied
by efforts to capture a larger share of earnings before they are
repatriated to the investing country (e.g., expropriation, in-
creased taxation, exchange controls, etc.)
ARGUMENTS FAVORING FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Economists have long worked under the assumption that,
on balance, benefits would accrue to countries successful in
attracting large amounts of foreign private investment. These
benefits, it was reasoned, would stem from the resulting in-
creased productive capacity and productivity of the recipient
countries as well as from various external economies and a
favorable effect on balance of payments. The reasoning behind
this point of view remains unproven. The generalities under-
lying this point of view are examined here and opened to
criticism in the next section.
Underdeveloped countries have, almost by definition, a low
capacity to generate equity investment.3 Borrowing funds for
equity investment is one possible source of capital, but it de-
pends in large part upon pre-existing equity and, therefore, it
does little good to speak of local businessmen obtaining loans
in international capital markets. Investment by foreigners can
be considered as a substitute for investment by businessmen
who are unable to raise capital. One might argue that rates of
investment could be improved through public borrowing since
official government organizations may have greater access to
loans. This however would raise the problem of selecting pro-
ductive uses for the publicly raised funds and increases the
probability that unproductive investments will be made. Private
investment by foreigners is preferable since there is no problem
of selecting productive investments and no drain on government
resources where irrational decisions are made.4
Foreign investors, in addition to bringing their capital, are
usually connected with world-wide distribution systems for
their respective outputs. Access to these markets is desirable
where production is accompanied by economies of scale which
cannot be exploited within the limited markets of most Latin
American economies. Again, there is an advantage in private
foreign investment over domestic public investment in that the
latter is less likely to have ready access to wide international
markets.
3 Jaguaribe, A Brazilian View, in How LATIN AMERICA VIEWS THE U.S.
INVESTOR 71 (R. Vernon ed. 1966).
4 G. MEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT Ch. 6 (1968).
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Foreign investors, in addition to their capital, contribute
to productivity growth in less developed countries by introducing
modern technology and administrative techniques. Should such
improvements be actively sought without the help of private
foreign investment, the recipient would be forced to pay for
use of patents, consulting fees, management contracts, etc. It is
obvious, of course, that these benefits will accrue to the recipient
country only where there are no major institutional barriers,
and where the technology in question is relevant to other sec-
tors of the developing economy. Some of the major complaints
of Latin Americans are that foreign investors employ few local
people and only a small portion of them in technical jobs there-
by limiting the transfer of new technology to other sectors. An
example is the Venezuelan petroleum industry which at times
has produced as much as 32% of the Venezuelan Gross Domestic
Product while employing only 2.6% of the active population.5
There is reason to doubt that the technology employed in pe-
troleum extractions can generally be applied to other sectors
of the Venezuelan economy.
Foreign investment exerts a multiplier effect stemming
first from the original injection of capital and secondly from
what Brazilian economist Helio Jaguaribe has called the "ger-
minative" effect." This effect refers to the development of new
investment possibilities arising from the linkages between the
original invstment and other sectors of the economy. Domestic
demands for raw materials or other inputs may increase, making
investments in those fields profitable. If the product of the
foreign owned enterprise is to be marketed locally, opportunities
for development of a local distribution system will appear.
The foreign producer may also supply some input such as fer-
tilizer or construction materials - which would normally have
to be imported at a higher price - and thereby increase the
profitability of production employing these inputs.
Increased investment from abroad will provide jobs locally
and serve to shift the distribution of income in favor of labor.
As local capital stock increases, the marginal productivity of
capital will fall and, assuming competitive markets, the return
to capital will also fall. Assuming a less than perfectly elastic
supply of labor this tendency will be accompanied by a simul-
taneous increase in the marginal productivity of labor and,
5 Prebisch, Commercial Policy in Underdeveloped Countries, Am. EcoN.
REV., May 1959, at 254.
6 Jaguaribe, supra note 3.
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therefore, wages. The importation of capital can then be an
integral part of the programs of many countries which are de-
signed to alleviate the extreme inequality of income and wealth.
Foreign investors produce for local markets some of the
items which would otherwise be imported, thereby saving scarce
foreign exchange. Also, the original capital import provides
foreign exchange and exerts a favorable influence on the bal-
ance of payments. This argument seems extraordinarily weak
in thaL we have already observed that capital investment in-
flows in one year lead to capital outflow in future years. Sec-
ondly, it is not clear that items purchased locally from foreign
owned firms would have been imported had those firms not
existed. It is possible that these purchases simply represent an
increase in consumption due to the increased availability and
lower prices of the items concerned. The so called "international
demonstration effect" has often been accused of creating de-
mands in developing countries for new items which are tra-
ditionally unavailable in those countries.7 The generalization
can not, therefore, be made that items produced for local con-
sumption by foreign investors would have been imported had
the investment not been made. It may simply be that these
items would not have been in demand and, therefore, not con-
sumed.
OPPOSITION TO PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Most arguments against foreign private investment in Latin
America claim that the value of the benefits from this activity
are exaggerated, are at best short-run, and are outweighed by
factors working to retard the recipient countries. This is especial-
ly true where the benefits are difficult to evaluate, such as those
accruing from availability of modern technology, patents, etc.
Claims are often made that these contributions do not warrant
the high profits extracted from investments in the area. It has
ever been argued that, in the long run, if private investment
is effective in providing the benefis that its proponents claim, e.g.,
missing inputs, modern technology, etc., its continued presence
in Latin America becomes increasingly unjustified.8
There seems to be little integration of the foreign invest-
ments into the recipient economies. Often technology is trans-
ferred directly from the investing country with little or no
7 Kottis, The International Demonstration Effect as a Factor Effecting
Economic Development, KYKLos, Vol. xxiv 1971, at 455-72.
8 Hirschman, How to Divest in Latin America and Why, in 76 ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 4 (1969).
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attempt to adapt it so as to improve its impact upon local eco-
nomic growth. Host country employees are usually not given
positions which allow them to develop the administrative skills
needed to manage a large business venture and technical in-
formation is often a guarded secret, only released in doses
sufficient to accomplish the task at hand. The importation of
foreign managers and rejection of local capital participation
confirm Latin American opinion that foreign investors do not
want to become part of the local society.9
Some of the most often heard complaints about the presence
of foreign investors in Latin America have to do with their
unfavorable effect on local competition. These accusations are
usually based upon the effective monopoly power of foreign
firms or upon their superior technical and financial abilities.
In the short run, local businessmen are at a disadvantage and,
in the long run, if they succumb to or simply accept the competi-
tive superiority of foreigners, they may fail to develop into an
active local entrepreneural group. There is a tendency in the
United States to brush aside this complaint with the comment
that such losses are well compensated for by the contribution of
foreign owned firms to the general welfare. 10
Special concessions offered by governments overly anxious
to attract modern technology and improve employment can pro-
vide foreign investors with a monopoly position. These con-
cessions may take the form of tax holidays or exclusive right
to engage in certain activities, thereby eliminating potential
competition and raising the probability of profit for those lucky
enough to obtain such concessions. These concessions are not
the fault of private investors per se, but an indication that
Latin Americans themselves have been unsure of exactly what
they want from private investors.
In some cases the very nature of the firms which seek
investments abroad implies some degree of monopoly. In the
case of the petroleum industry there are important economies of
scale available in crude oil exploration and distribution. Sup-
pliers of oil are hesitant to use price reductions to adjust pro-
duction and scales since other suppliers can respond with off-
setting reductions. To secure stable markets, producers try to
9 Wionczek, A Latin American View, in How LATIN AMERICA VIEWS THE
U.S. INVESTOR 21 (R. Vernon ed. 1966).
lOhnson, U.S. Private Investment in Latin America: Some Questions
of National Policy, The Rand Corp. Memorandum RM-4092-ISA, July
1964.
1972
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develop vertically integrated refining and marketing facilities."1
Potential oil producers in Latin America have little choice in
developing that resource for export since access to oil markets
is only available through the large international oil companies
and at a price determined by the few firms involved. In most
cases markets are blocked to new oil producing countries, un-
less the rights to oil extraction are granted to the large interna-
tional oil firms.
Latin Americans particularly resent the displacement or
absorption of their domesic enterprise by foreigners. For in-
stance, manufacturing firms are usually concerned with cap-
turing markets and, with this security, maximizing profits.1
2
Such a process is illustrated by the absorption of "Adesite," a
Brazilian adhesive tape factory, by the Union Carbide Corpor-
ation. "Adesite" was a Sao Paulo firm which grew from a
simple workshop into a factory with monthly output ex-
ceeding 500 million Cruzelros. Minnesota Mining & Manufac-
turing Company, also selling tape on the Brazilian market,
began cutting prices by up to 40%, causing the sales of "Ade-
site" to fall precipitously. Under these circumstances, Union
Carbide was able to buy out "Adesite" and enter into an agree-
ment with Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing to divide the Bra-
zilian market in half and to raise the price of their adhesive
tapes by about 50%.1 3 One may argue that there was not neces-
sarily a conscious attempt by these North American firms to es-
tablish a more oligopolistic market favoring themselves, but the
fact remains that such takeovers do occur, and they do dis-
courage local invesors as well as stimulate political resistance to
private foreign investors.
Investors from developed countries are assisted in taking
over local business by a high incidence of business recession
in Latin America countries. During these crises, local firms are
unfavorably affected by declining sales, unavailability of do-
mestic credit, and, at times, devaluation of national currencies
which can aggravate externally held debt. Foreign firms can
weather these situations more easily because they have access
to wider markets and to external credit sources. Thus, under
such circumstances, local firms can be obtained easily by
11 Vernon, Foreign Enterprise and Developing Nations in the Raw Mate-
rials Industries, AM. ECON. REV., May 1970, at 122-23.
12 V. URGuIDI, THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 103
(1964).
3 Galeano, The De-Nationalization of Brazilian Industry, MONTHLY RE-
VIEw, DEC. 1969, at 18-19.
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foreign owners at prices which are sometimes considered ex-
traordinarily low, but, nevertheless, are acceptable to owners
on the verge of bankruptcy. This process has been observed
in such countries as Argentina during the 1962-63 recession and
Brazil during the Castelo Branco anti-inflationary drives.14
There are strong foreign elements in the dynamic sectors
of Latin American economies and there seems to be a direct
correlation between such dynamism and foreign participation. 5
Among Latin Americans this is interpreted as an indication
that foreign firms, due to their technical and financial advan-
tages, can and do move into those sectors promising greatest
profits thereby eliminating opportunity for domestic business-
men and transferring abroad many of the fruits of development.
This leads to a continually decreasing autonomy for the host
country since growth becomes increasingly dependent upon
foreigners, and more growth implies less autonomy. This con-
cern over control of the productive processes of the host coun-
try is not limited to the countries of Latin America. Canada,
Europe and Australia are also hosts to large amounts of foreign
investment particularly from the United States, and all have
expressed concern over foreign ownership of important eco-
nomic sectors.'6
Special concern exists in Latin America over the foreign
domination of exports of petroleum, mineral ores and metals.
Nearly all exports of these items are produced by relatively
few foreign owned firms. For example, two U.S. companies,
Kennecott and Anaconda, before their expropriation in 1971,
produced about 90% of Chile's output of copper. In Peru, three
American firms, the Southern Peru Copper Company, Cerro de
Pasco and Northern Peru Mining Company, accounted for 83%
of copper mined and 99% of smeltered copper.17 The reasons
for this domination are that the principal markets for these
items are in the developed countries and the search for sup-
14C. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BusINEss ABROAD 159-60 (1969); Ferrer,
El Capital Extranjero en la Econornia Argentina, EL TRIMES'.E Eco-
NOMICO, Abril-Junio 1971, at 314.
15 For an Argentine example, see Ferrer, supra note 14, at 302.
16 Fear of foreign control expanding from important economic sectors
into domestic politics is very prevalent in Latin America and increases
their distaste for large foreign investors. Latins "know" that firms such
as ITT attempt to influence local politics through extra-legal means.
Allegedly, that firm attempted to prevent the inauguration of freely
elected Marxist Salvador Allende as President of Chile in 1970. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 24, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
17 Mikesell, The Contribution of Petroleum and Mining Resources to Eco-
nomic Development, in FOREIGN IIvESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND
MINERAL INDUSTRY 9-10 (R. Mikesell ed. 1971).
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pliers of these resources has usually originated in developed
countries. Firms from the developed countries also control the
international markets for most of these materials making it
difficult for newcomers to enter the field. Secondly, the tech-
nology employed in petroleum and minerals extraction is dif-
ficult to acquire and often is not available without the cooper-
ation of the international firms already possessing it. Latin
American countries attempting to extract such materials on
their own often encounter technological difficulties which can
be remedied only by making concessions to foreign investors.18
Thirdly, the international companies have relatively enormous
amounts of capital at their disposal and are able to reduce
the risk involved in exploration through diversification of their
efforts.19 In most Latin American countries, the road to devel-
opment is seen to be through industrialization and so this
exploitation of mineral resources by foreigners is thought of
as a raid on industrial inputs which will be needed for future
economic growth. Latin Americans charge that concessions
used to attract investors into these fields have been excessive,
causing the cost of mineral extraction to appear too low to
those parties acquiring the rights to these resources. As a
result, reserves are depleted so rapidly and so completely as
to leave nothing as an input for domestic industry.
UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING PRIVATE INVESTMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA
Most North Americans feel that the advantages of private
investment are so evident that the case for it is seldom made
explicit. It is often pointed out that the United States own
rapid development in the 19th and early 20th century was
dependent upon foreign capital. Also, like most developing
countries now, the U.S. had to cope with the vagaries of
world demand for a few agricultural products such as cotton
and tobacco. It is implied that since the early experience of
the United States and the current situation in Latin America are
so similar, the developmental success of the U.S. can be dupli-
cated simply by imitating U.S. economic policy. Private foreign
investment was good for U.S. development and, therefore, is
recommended for others.
181 d.; Edwards, The Frondizi Contracts and Petroleum Self-Sufficiency in
Argentina, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINING IN-
DUSTRY Ch. 1 (R. Mikesell ed. 1971).
19 Mikesell, supra note 17; Loehr, The Supply of Risk Bearers in Under-
developed Countries: A Ccmment (unpublished article being revised for
publication at GSIS, University of Denver).
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Impressive economic advances made by Puerto Rico are
sometimes alluded to as an indication that Latin Americans
can accelerate economic development by employing similar
techniques which rely heavily upon investment by foreigners
- particularly upon investment originating in the United
States.20 Latin Americans would argue that Puerto Rico has paid
the unacceptable price of complete loss of political independence.
They reject the Puerto Rican model for exactly the same reasons
that the United States urges them to reject the techniques which
have led to the economic gains of countries within the Soviet
orb.21
U.S. policy makers point out that in addition to the ad-
vantages of private investment indicated above and the success
of the U.S. development model, private enterprise yields the
additional return of political stability and democracy. In their
opposition to private investment, Latin Americans fail to
"appreciate fully the connection between private enterprise and
political freedom. ' 22 This connection is found in, first, the sup-
port that private enterprise lends to the development of a broad
middle class of managers, property owners and small capitalists.
It is assumed that this middle class would then function in
much the same way as it does in the United States; through
relatively well informed expression of political opinion. Sec.
ondly, by diffusing economic power and decision making
throughout the economy, private enterprise would provide a
bulwark supporting individual freedom against the rise of
an arbitrary centralized power.
This argument has been particularly unpalatable to Latin
Americans. Instead of leading to the development of a solid
middle class, foreign investment is observed to create relative
economic giants. Foreign investors, they argue, stunt the de-
velopment of local businessmen because of their superior com-
petitive position and, therefore, they retard the development
of an articulate middle class. Latin Americans are fearful of a
loss of personal freedom to an arbitrary, centralized power.
Many countries are already strongly influenced by decisions
made externally, beyond the control of their national gov-
2 0 E. HANSON, PuERTO Rico: ALLY FOR PROGRESS (1962).
21 Hirschman, Abrazo vs. Coexistence: Comments on Yypsilon's Paper, in
LATIN AMERICA IssUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS 62 (Hirschman ed. 1961).
2 2 
JOINT ECONOMIC COMIviTI'EE, SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIPS, PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, J.C. Doe. No.
33-147, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1964).
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ernments. Experience has also shown that where foreign capi-
tal has been relatively unimpeded, the benefits to the host
country are distributed in favor of a few local businessmen who
come to wield inordinate economic power. Rather than diffuse
private economic power, unimpeded foreign private investment
may enhance its concentration. While this phenomenon can be
observed in varying degrees in different countries, nowhere is
it more obvious than in one of Latin America's poorest countries,
Nicaragua. Not only has private economic power been concen-
trated in the hands of very few members of the Somoza family
and their friends, but those same hands hold the political reins
as well. United States cooperation in allowing the Somoza
dynasty to develop and continue in power, perpetuates the im-
pression in other Latin American countries that this is the
type of political stability and democracy the United States
advocates.
United States policy regarding private investment in Latin
America seems to be based upon an ignorance of the possible
detrimental effects of such investment. The unquestioning sup-
port offered to private investors is reflected by the main policies
in this area: the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign As-
sistance Act and the U.S. Investment Guarantee Program. An
examination of these policies leads us to discover that they
build rigidities into our mixture of policy instruments which
often lead us to results which are neither in the interests of
the United States nor of Latin America.
HicKENLooPER AMENDMENT
The Hickenlooper Amendment, originally attached to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and later in a modified form
to the same Act of 1964, seeks to improve upon the investment
climate in less developed countries by using foreign aid as a
threat. The Amendment requires the President to terminate
foreign aid and sugar quotas to countries which expropriate
(or levy taxes which are expropriationary on) the property of
U.S. citizens and, fail within six months to take steps toward
equitable compensation in convertible foreign exchange. Sup-
port for this policy developed during the aftermath of the
Cuban expropriation of U.S. properties valued at over $1 bil-
lion,23 and during negotiations concerning the expropriated
23 It is of interest that U.S. investors in Cuba felt so secure that none had
obtained investment guarantees which were available from AID or its
predecessors. See Derkash; Nationalism in South America: Adios to U.S.
Investors?, May 1971 (Occasional Studies No. 5, Division of Research,
College of Business Administration, University of Denver).
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properties of ITT in Brazil.24 The 1964 revision of the Amend-
ment dealt with adjudication in U.S. courts in cases of alleged
injustices done to U.S. investors in foreign countries. Known
also as the "Sabbatino Amendment," it provided that:
No court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the
merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a
case in which a claim of title or another right is asserted by any
party ... by an act of that state in violation of the principles of
international law, including the principles of compensation. 25
Supporters of these measures claimed that they would protect
U.S. property owners from arbitrary expropriation and there-
by encourage more private investment in less developed coun-
tries. Secondly, they argued that it would not be wise to
provide aid to countries which violated the rights of U.S.
citizens.
26
One can easily question the authority of the United States
in the application of the 1964 Amendment. Rather than a
strengthening of international law this Amendment appears as
an attempt by the U.S. Congress to create international law.
It is quite doubtful that this attitude will foster an increasingly
orderly world based upon a strong system of international law
since it serves to divide the countries concerned rather than
create a consensus on the solutions to problems. It is also rather
naive of the supporters of this policy to imagine that they
have the power to make and enforce legal decisions in another
country. In the event that U.S. courts ruled in favor of an
expropriated U.S. investor in another country, how could the
U.S. effect a settlement?
The Hickenlooper Amenmdent has been criticized by both
the State Department 27 and U.S. businessmen with interests in
Latin America. 28 They maintain that the Amendment is self-
defeating since it polarizes and hardens the positions of the
parties concerned and makes unlikely a settlement which is
favorable to U.S. interests. In an atmosphere in which most
24 Shortly after the Amendment was passed, a settlement between Brazil
and ITT was reached. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXPROPRIATION OF
AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE TWEN-
TIrrH CENTURY, Comm. Print No. 20-821 Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1963).
25 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1964) as quoted in Derkash, supra note 23.
26 This attitude implies that aid is a form of reward for behavior agreeable
to the U.S.
27 EXPROPRIATION, supra note 24, at 27.
28 Hearing on the Alliance for Progress Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
American Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 389-90 (1969).
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Latin American countries are attempting to build national
pride, most people and politicians are sensitive to outside
pressures. The U.S. threat to discontinue aid to enforce com-
pensation for expropriated properties is likely to solidify local
support against compensation. Attempts to force compensation
are likely to create a situation which, from the point of view
of the political decision maker in the expropriating country,
compensation is viewed as politically impossible. The deadline
proposed by the Amendment creates a tense negotiating at-
mosphere and gives the impression of a presupposition by the
United States that other governments will not honor their
obligations according to international law. Rather than impose
sanctions within the stated six months, it would be better to
leave the issue unresolved. As long as the issue remains unre-
solved there is at least a possibility of a mutually acceptable
solution.
An indication that the Hickenlooper Amendment is not
deeded and is probably detrimental to U.S. interests can be
seen in recent cases of expropriation in Latin America. In Ar-
gentina, rights to petroleum exploitation have been in and out
of the hands of private foreign investors.2 9 Foreigners were in-
vited to exploit oil reserves during the last few months of the
Peron" regime only to have their contracts revoked during the
post-Peron era. Foreign firms, invited back by President Fron-
dizi, beginning in 1958, found their contracts annulled and
properties expropriated in 1963 by the Illia government. By
1965, the latter realized that the Argentine YPF (Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales), the publicly owned petroleum company,
was unable to supply the country with enough petroleum prod-
ucts and so again foreign investors were invited to exploit that
resource. The important thing about this series of expropria-
tions of, and invitations to, foreign investors is that in none
of the cases were agreements reached on compensation. Com-
pensation for the 1963 expropriations was still being negotiated
when the firms were invited back. Rather than losing, the
firms concerned may have gained; because in each case when
they were invited back they were able to secure contracts much
more favorable to themselves. Had the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment been invoked the matter would have been settled after
six months, with the companies receiving only partial compen-
sation-or in some cases nothing. In none of these cases did
29 Gardner, The Y.P.F., Spring 1969 (a paper prepared for Economics 587
at the University of Colorado).
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the "investment climate" seem to be damaged, since each time
they were invited back foreign investors were willing to bid
for new explorations contracts.
United States reaction to the expropriation of the Inter-
national Petroleum Company (IPC) by Peru in 1968 involved
the use of the Hickenlooper Amendment as a threat-an empty
threat it turned out since compensation was not forthcoming
and aid has not been officially discontinued (but substantially
reduced). This crisis was a result of a long dispute between
the IPC and Peru, with claims and counter-claims asserted in
both directions. During the latter years of the Belaunde ad-
ministration negotiations broke down repeatedly. Pressure for
settling in favor of the IPC was exerted by the U.S. by reduc-
ing aid to Peru to a mere fraction of what it had been before
the dispute. The main point at issue seemed to be the way in
which profits would be split. The fact that an agreement was
not reached and that the aid reductions of about $150 million
during a four year period far exceeded the profits to be gained
by Peru had they reached a settlement favoring themselves,
indicates that control over the Peruvian petroleum industry
was of greater importance to the Peruvian government than
mere monetary reward. Eventually President Belaunde reached
an agreement with the IPC which was proven politically un-
acceptable by his overthrow in late 1968, and the almost im-
mediate expropriation of the IPC by his successor, General
Velasco.
Negotiations between the Velasco government and the
United States quickly polarized. The U.S. took up the IPC claim
without question and wielded the threat of suspending aid.
General Velasco assumed the only politically acceptable role -
indeed the one which brought him to power-demanding that
the IPC pay its back debts to Peru and telling the United States,
in almost so many words, that they may keep their aid. Due
to this intransigence on both sides, the IPC has been banished
from Peru and any hope for compensation for property seized
has vanished. In the end the Hickenlooper Amendment was
not applied since Latin American sympathies were strongly
on the side of Peru, elevating General Velasco to near hero
status. Suspension of aid would simply make the United States
appear more of a bully in the eyes of most Latin Americans. °
30 For an excellent account of the IPC story and the events leading to its
expropriation by General Velasco, see Goodwin, Letter from Peru,
NEW YORKER, May 17, 1969.
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What did the use of the Hickenlooper Amendment as a
threat accomplish? It did not protect the IPC properties, and
may have helped in creating an atmosphere in which com-
pensation was impossible. It did not improve the investment
climate for U.S. investors, but does not seem to have damaged
Peru as a host to international corporations of other nationali-
ties. British Petroleum has recently been granted an explora-
tion contract to develop oil in the Amazonian territories and
a British-Canadian partnership 31 has been contracted to exploit
the potentially large Cerro Verde copper deposits. Seven com-
panies, mostly European were competing for contracts to pro-
duce diesel engines and seven more to manufacture tractors.8
2
Other U.S. political interests have suffered, since in response
to the U.S. attitude General Velasco has become increasingly
allied with the Soviet Union. Also, the realization by other coun-
tries that the Hickenlooper Amendment was really a bluff could
have been the final straw leading to further expropriations by
Peru, as well as similar moves by Chile, Colombia, Ecuador
and Bolivia.
U.S. INVESTMENT GUARANTEE PROGRAM
The U.S. Investment Guarantee Program (IGP) began in
1948 as an inducement to U.S. businessmen to invest in Europe.
Initial coverage of currency conversion risks was expanded to
include protection against confiscatory expropriation (1950.) and
risk of loss from war and insurrection (1956). The list of coun-
tries in which investments could be secured gradually expanded
so as to place greater emphasis upon investments in less de-
veloped countries. These latter have become the primary area
covered since 1959. 3 3
In principle the concept of investment guarantees for new
investments in less developed countries seems sound. Conflict
between expropriated companies and host countries stemming
from disagreement over "prompt, adequate and effective" com-
pensation may be avoided. What is compensation to a govern-
ment may not be considered compensation by a private business
firm. Subrogation by the U.S. government may allow compen-
sation in a form which is in the national interest but which
could never have been acceptable to the private claimant. The
31 Partnership composed of British Smelter Construction and Wright En-
gineering of Vancouver.
32 LATIN AMERICA, Oct. 15, 1971, and Nov. 19, 1971.
3. For greater detail on coverages and qualifications for coverage, see Glick
& Tozier, Government Guarantees for Your Investmer',_ Abroad, MERC-
ERS AND AcQUISITIONS, Fall 1965 and Winter 1966.
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U.S. government may be willing to accept such things as long
term obligations, payment in "soft" currencies or other in-
tangibles not directly related to the expropriation dispute. In
the IPC case, the United States might have been willing to ac-
cept a resolution of the long standing dispute over commercial
fishing rights in waters off the Peruvian coast as a quid pro quo
for claims arising out of the expropriation. Thus greater flexi-
bility could be acquired in the handling of compensation prob-
lems.34
In practice, U.S. investment guarantees have proven to be
a potential source of tension and political influence. The IGP
only covers investments in countries which have signed bi-
lateral investment guarantee agreements with the United States,
under the auspices of AID. There is evidence to indicate that
where countries were reluctant to sign such agreements, pressure
was exerted on them to cooperate 3 5 In testimony before the U.S.
Congress' Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, when asked
whether there has been a strong coercive element in the invest-
ment guarantee program, Joseph A. Silberstein"0 responded:
"I know there was a coercive element for a period of time
that if by such and such a date a country had not entered into
an investment guarantee agreement, we would have to termi-
nate aid."37
In fact, it exists as a presumption in the legislation that there
should be such agreements, leaving to the President the question
of continuing aid.3 8 One official interpretation states. that where
host countries are "unwilling or unable" to put an end to the
"domestic risks of expropriation," government guarantees should
be employed to ease the uncertainties of private investors3 9
"Unwillingness" and "inability" to end expropriation risk are
two entirely different matters. The latter implies that attempts
are being made unsuccessfully, while the former implies a
definite choice to include expropriation as a potential means
to control foreign investors. In effect, this attitude advocates
stimulation of U.S. investment even in the countries which
do not want U.S. investors and which would find the presence
34 Groves, Expropriation in Latin America: Some Observations, 23 INTER-
AMERICAN ECON. AFFAIRS 60 (1969).
35 Wionczek, supra note 9, at 14.
36 Director, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State.
37 Hearings, supra note 28, at 13.
38 Id.
39 JOINT ECONOMIC COMMrTTEE, SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIPS, PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, J.C. Doc. No. 59-
071, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966).
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of such investors in conflict with their national interests. Such
a policy can only add to the tensions between already existing
U.S. investors and their host countries, increasing the probability
that expropriation will be used as a tool for bringing about
economic institutional arrangements acceptable to the host
country.
With the above in mind it is not difficult to see why the
IGP has been another source of resentment among Latin Amer-
icans. They see it as simply one more instrument with which
the United States can extend its influence in their countries,
even when those countries are trying to resist such extension.
They are angered by reference to the IGP as part of the ". .. re-
sidual responsibility of the U.S. Government to protect its in-
vestors abroad and the degree of pressure which we can exer-
cise, with or without legal means, including the AID program. '4"
It is difficult to see the IGP as simply another form of aid in
view of such evidence as to the program's political content.41
Proposals for multilateral investment insurance, directed
through some international agency, seem far preferable to the
IGP. In this manner political objectives of parties concerned
would be moderated by force of international agreement. Also,
both host country and capital exporting country would share
in the insurance burden. Countries which did not want to
attract foreign capital would simply choose not to participate.
Participation by a potential host country would be a clear sign
to investors that that country wanted foreign investors and
was taking steps to attract them. Since payment for claims
would be borne in part by all signatories, irresponsible acts
by one host country would clearly be felt by other hosts,
thereby providing stimulus for each host country to exert their
influence on other hosts to minimize claims. This is just the
opposite of the present situation where, if anything, an expro-
priating host is supported by other host countries. These pro-
posals would help minimize the development of the attitude
that neither the host nor the company will suffer, since the
U.S. government would pay the claim.
42
4" Ambassador Milton Barall, Head, Caribbean Study Group, Dept. of State,
AID. Statement in Hearings, supra note 28, at 235.
41 There is some indication, political factors aside, that the IGP is not
needed. Since the beginning of the program in 1948, there have been
so few claims paid, four as of 1969, as to leave these events actuarily
insignificant. That U.S. private investment in Mexico is greater than
in any other Latin American country, and that investment guarantees
are not available there, thrcwS further doubt on the need for the IGP.
42 For some details on the oecial features of multilateral investment in-
surance proposals, see Martin, Multilateral Investment -Insurance, 8
HARV. INT'L L.J. 280 (1967).
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CONCLUSIONS
The case for private investment in Latin America or any
developing region is indeed uneasy. Potentially, advantages can
accrue to countries hosting foreign private investors in the form
of improved technology, increased productive capacity, greater
employment and short run balance of payments improvement.
The presence of such investment, however, can have an un-
favorable impact upon local enetrpreneurs, long run balance
of payments and upon the ability of the host country to control
its own economic destiny. Which forces predominate is unclear.
No generalization can be made that private foreign investment
is "good" or "bad" for the host country since each investment-
host combination will differ in its overall economic properties.
United States policy toward private investment in Latin
America has been based upon the assumption that it is always
to the hosts' advantage to have more foreign private investment
than less. Policies based upon this unrealistic assumption have
not and cannot be successful in improving the so called "in-
vestment climate" in Latin America nor in protecting U.S.
investors from expropriation. The government of the United
States should neither promote nor discourage private investment
flowing from the U.S. to Latin America. Investment decisions
should be made solely by the firms concerned, taking into
account the economic soundness of the venture, the laws of the
host country and its reputation for keeping its promises. The
U.S. government should neither insure investment nor parti-
cipate in any private insurance plan.
What might be called a "market" solution to the private
investment problem should be sought in that an environment
lacking distortions caused by unrealistic policies either on the
part of investing or host countries is most preferable. Sound
foreign investment practices will occur in the future only
through arrangements mutually satisfactory to host govern-
ments and investors. Countries convinced that foreign private
investment will benefit them will soon discover the measures
necessary to attract the attention of investors. Hosts, convinced
that on balance they are being harmed by the investments of
foreigners, will be free to follow policies which exclude them.
Under the current system, these latter are often forced to host
investors which they consider contrary to their national inter-
ests, and are at the same time chastened for their sometimes
harsh acts against these investors. Such harshness can only be
198 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
expected in these cases and could have been avoided in the
first place had the unwilling host been free to exclude the
objectionable investor. By experience countries will learn that if
there are benefits to be gained from private foreign investment,
certain activities (e.g. expropriation) will severely limit their
ability to enjoy those benefits. On the other hand, if such in-
vestment places an uncompensated cost upon the host, it will
simply be excluded.
Investing firms will be under constraints similar to host
countries. They will soon learn which modes of behavior are
compatible with their own interests and those of the host.
Should those modes be violated in ways injurious to the latter,
settlement in host country courts is clearly necessary. Firms
will quickly discover where they are welcome and where they
are not. Investment decisions could, therefore, be made with a
clearer assessment of the "investment climate" than is now
possible.
One might ask whether the adoption of such a policy of
non-interference by the United States would mean a rash of ex-
propriations of property now owned by U.S. interests in Latin
America. Surely there will be expropriation in some cases where
the investments are particularly disliked by their Latin Ameri-
can hosts. But is this not what is taking place anyway in Peru,
Chile, Bolivia, etc.? Expropriations will not increase significantly
because each country would realize that a policy of wholesale
expropriation would be a clear sign to foreigners that they are
not wanted. Host countries would not generally want to give
such an impression since most of them realize that under some
circumstances private foreign investors can be of benefit to them.
They would not want to jeopardize their option of attracting
certain kinds of investors by creating the general impression
that they are against all private foreign investment. Only those
investments clearly contrary to national interests are likely to
be expropriated, 4" and only those countries which do not want
any private foreign investment are likely to pursue general
expropriation policies. In this latter case the overall investment
climate would be improved since investors would know pre-
cisely where and under what circumstances they were welcome.
.,:,Much of the trauma and international conflict associated with expropria-
tion could be avoided through the use of an international divestment
mechanism as suggested by Albert 0. Hirschman. How to Divest, supra
note 8.
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